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A s s i s t e d  S u i c i d e :  C a n  W e  
L e a r n  f r o n t  G e r m a n y ?
b y  M a r g a r e t  P .  B a t t i n
s the United States’ public 
discussion of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide grows in­
creasingly volatile, our inter­
est in the Netherlands— the only 
country that openly permits the prac­
tice of euthanasia—has grown enor­
mously. How do they do it? we ask. What 
drugs do they use? How many cases of 
euthanasia are performed in a year? Is 
there abuse? In asking these questions, 
and in listening to the legions of 
bioethicists and reporters and con­
cerned physicians who have been to the 
Netherlands to scrutinize this practice, 
we are in effect regarding the Nether­
lands as a kind of natural laboratory for 
our own possible experiments in right- 
to-die legislation. Should we legalize 
euthanasia, as was on the ballot in the 
state of Washington in 1991 and is 
proposed for the ballot in California in 
1992? Let us look to the Netherlands, 
we say.1 O f course, examining 
euthanasia in the Netherlands has led 
to considerable controversy about just 
what is to be observed there—some 
claim there is virtually no abuse, others 
insist abuse is widespread'—and about 
the degree to which what we learn can 
be translated to the U.S., given differen­
ces in law, health care systems and other 
social factors,3 but all parties seem to 
agree that whatever is happening in 
Holland, it has important lessons for us.
However, voluntary active euthanasia 
is not the only form of aid-in-dying on 
the ballot in the United States. Initiative 
119 and the proposed California legisla­
tion would also legalize physician-as­
sisted suicide. Yet although the Nether­
lands also now tolerates physician-as­
sisted suicide under the same legal de­
vice that it tolerates euthanasia, the 
rates of practice are quite different: 
while about 1.8 percent of all deaths in 
the Netherlands are the result of eutha­
nasia, only about 0.3 percent involve 
physician-assisted suicide.4 It is eutha­
nasia in the Netherlands that has at­
tracted the world’s notice; assisted sui­
cide has played only a very minor 
supporting role.
\et in the United Slates, there seems 
to be nearly as much— or perhaps 
more— public sympathy for assisted sui-
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cide as for active euthanasia. In a Boston 
Gfofe/Harvard survey of U.S. attitudes 
toward death and dying taken in Oc­
tober 1991, for example, 54 percent of 
a national sample of 1,311 adults over 
age eighteen said that if they had an 
illness with no hope of recovery and 
were suffering a great deal of physical 
pain, they would or probably would 
consider asking their doctor to admin­
ister lethal drugs or a lethal injection; 
and 53 percent said that in the same 
circumstances they would or probably 
would ask their doctor to prescribe a 
lethal drug that they could decide to 
take later on.’ Significandy, the opposi­
tion to Initiative 119 in the state of 
Washington focused almost exclusively 
on the dangers of euthanasia, not as­
sisted suicide: prevent “medical homi­
cide,” was the cry,6 but litde was said 
about restricting a patient’s freedom to 
choose suicide—which, in Washington 
as in almost all other states, is not illegal. 
Given the currendy chaotic and in­
creasingly callous nature of health care 
financing in the United States, prefer­
ring assisted suicide to active euthanasia 
is not, I think, an unrealistic position. 
Because the U.S. is so sensitive (as it 
should be) to the risks of abuse, and 
because permitting assisted suicide 
would require a less dramatic change in 
the law, I think that the United States 
will come to accept assisted suicide in 
the relatively near future, officially as 
well as tacidy, but is likely to resist legal­
izing active euthanasia for a longer 
time.
But if this is so, then there is some­
thing ironic about turning only to the 
Netherlands for insight into issues of 
aid-in-dying: the Netherlands evidently 
prefers euthanasia to assisted suicide. 
What lessons can we learn from a 
country that sees things the other way 
around? Germany openly permits the
practice of assisted suicide, but rejects 
euthanasia. Thus it is in a sense die 
obverse of the Netherlands; hence 
despite many other differences, the les­
sons to be learned here should be at 
least equally, or perhaps more, instruc­
tive for us.
That the Germans view aid-in-dying 
issues differently from the Dutch is litde 
surprise, given their quite opposite his­
tories in the Second World War. In the 
minds of most Germans, the very term 
euthanasia is associated with the Nazis, 
and, in general, it is understood as in­
voluntary killing on potentially political 
radier than medical grounds. Rejection 
of euthanasia may also be associated 
with distrust of physicians in an authori­
tarian medical climate. To be sure, since 
the mid-1980s there has been some re­
newed discussion among bioethicists of 
voluntary active euthanasia, but re- 
cendy even the very discussion of it has 
been vigorously combatted by a coali­
tion of protest groups. They claim that 
even to speak of euthanasia is to legiti­
mate it; speeches have been silenced 
and entire conferences driven out of 
the country to prevent the raising of this 
issue.7 For a complex set of reasons, 
however, attitudes toward assisted sui­
cide are conceptually different from 
attitudes toward euthanasia, and unlike 
the U.S. and Holland assisted suicide is 
not regarded simply as a variant of 
euthanasia differing primarily in who 
delivers the fatal dose.
The situation with respect to assisted 
suicide in Germany is marked by two 
important features. For one thing, the 
practice is both legal and partly institu­
tionalized; it occurs on a much larger 
scale and in different ways than in Hol­
land, and of course occurs in a way not 
currendy possible in the United States. 
Second, the practice of assisted suicide 
in Germany is embedded in a distinc­
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tive cultural climate, especially con­
cerning the background conception of 
suicide; its features can best be made 
evident by looking at linguistic differ­
ences between German and English. 
Not only do patients with terminal ill­
nesses have different options concern­
ing suicide in Germany than they do in 
the U.S.; they are also able to talk differ­
ently about it and presumably think 
differently about it as well. The two 
main parts of this paper will address 
these two principal concerns.
The Character of German Medicine
At least in what was formerly West 
Germany, medicine is technologically 
advanced, and, und er a com p lex  
national health insurance system, pro­
vides a high level of care to virtually all 
inhabitants. Like the United States, 
Germany has entered the most ad­
vanced stage of what is known as the 
epidemiological transition, and the ma­
jority of deaths no longer occur, as they 
did in earlier historical periods and still 
do in the third world, as the result of 
parasitic or infectious disease, but as the 
result of advanced deteriorative disease 
late in life— cancer, heart and other 
deteriorative organ failure, stroke, neu­
rological diseases, and so on. Like 
Am erican medicine, G erm an medi­
cine has the capacity to “prolong” the 
lives of dying patients by means of res­
piratory, nutritional, and other sup­
port, but by no means always does so: a 
substantial proportion of expected  
deaths are “negotiated,” the result of 
artful giving up. As in the U.S., in Ger­
many it is also often held appropriate to 
withhold or withdraw treatment from  
patients in the late stages of terminal 
illness, when survival is unlikely and 
treatment seems only to prolong dying. 
In this respect, American and German  
medicine are similar.
However, German medicine is often 
said to be quite authoritarian. Although 
empirical data have yet to be published, 
a large study currently in progress at the 
University of Gottingen is exploring a 
num ber of hypotheses that are often 
said to characterize medical decision­
making.8 T hese cen ter around the 
claim that decisionmaking remains 
largely in the hands of the physician; 
while consent by the patient is legally 
required, and indeed consent forms for 
major procedures are routinely signed,
neither patientunderstanding nor con­
sent are much emphasized. In circum­
stances in which the patient faces on­
coming death, according to the hy­
potheses of the Gottingen study, it is the 
physician who makes decisions about 
the initiation or withdrawal of life-sus­
taining therapy. In these decisions, the 
evaluations and views of nurses and 
other caregivers play a considerable 
role and consent is for the m ost part 
sought from  the patient’s relatives; 
however, in most cases the patient, 
who is often no longer competent, is 
not included in decisionmaking. Living 
wills are rarely used; the durable power 
of attorney has only com e into effect as 
of I January 1992. Do-not-resuscitate 
orders are rarely explicitly executed  
and only in exceptional cases put in 
written form; for the most part they are 
made in agreem ent with the family but 
without discussion with the patient. 
W here they are written at a)f, DNR  
orders are  only very briefly docu­
mented and supported. The wishes of 
a com petent patient are for the most 
part considered, but only if they are 
clearly expressed and if the conditions 
for patient decisions— namely, ade­
quate information and explanation—  
have been m e t However, this is the 
exception, not the rule. For the most 
part, there is no such thing as informed  
con sent In general, decisions about 
life-sustaining therapy are made by the 
physician, not the patient, and are con­
sented to by the family. If the physician 
favors initiating intensive measures and 
the patient or family do not, the physi­
cian’s preference for the most part pre­
vails, and while explicit disagreement is 
rare, where a lucid patient expresses the 
wish to decline life-prolonging meas­
ures, this wish is frequently ignored. 
The only case, according to the hy­
potheses of this study, in which patient 
or family preferences appear to prevail 
over those of the physician is when the 
physician opposes initiating intensive 
measures, but the patient or family 
demand them.
It is in this medical climate that Ger­
many’s distinctive practices concerning  
suicide in end-of-life situations have 
begun to develop. For the most part, 
patients “in the system” of hospital care 
do not demand or achieve self-determi­
nation in matters of dying. However, 
taking advantage of the legal situation 
in Germany with respect to suicide,
there has developed a substantial move­
m ent to avoid such situations alto­
gether. It is led by a large, independent, 
nongovernmental, and nonmedical or­
ganization, the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fur humanes Sterben (DGHS), or Ger­
man Society for Humane Dying, which 
actively supports suicide or assisted sui­
cide as a way o f achieving a painless, 
self-determined death.
Suicide and Euthanasia under 
German Law
T he existence of the DGHS is made 
possible by a distinctive feature of Ger­
man law, a feature in which German law 
differs from that of England, the U.S., 
the Netherlands, and most of Europe. 
During the Middle Ages in most of 
Europe suicide was a felony punishable 
by desecration of the corpse, burial at a 
crossroads, forfeiture of the decedent’s 
estate to the crown, and, in some in­
stances, execution if the suicide attempt 
was not fatal. Suicide was decriminal­
ized in England and Wales only in 1961, 
primarily for the purpose of permitting 
m edical and psychiatric treatm en t 
without criminal onus for those who 
had attempted suicide. In contrast, sui­
cide was decriminalized in Germany by 
Frederick the Great in 1751. Assisting 
suicide is not a crim e in Germany  
either, provided that the person about 
to com m it suicide is tathemchaftsjahig, 
that is, capable of exercising control 
over his or her actions, and also that he 
or she acts out offreiverantivortlzche Wille, 
or freely responsible choice.9 Thus, 
while assisting the suicide of a dis­
turbed, depressed, or dem ented per­
son o r a person coerced by external 
forces would not be permitted under 
German law, aiding an informed, vol­
u ntary  suicide, including what we 
m ight be tempted to call a “rational 
suicide,” is. However, killing upon re­
quest— the act involved in eutha­
nasia— is prohibited under German  
law.
To be sure, the details of German law 
on these points have been receiving 
extended discussion, especially with re­
spect to the apparent conflict between 
the fact that assisted suicide is not illegal 
but that there may be a duty to rescue a 
suicide in progress. Like U.S. law, Ger­
man law imposes an obligation to res­
cue upon specific parties standing in 
certain professional or personal rela­
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tionships to other persons; this is the 
basis o f the physician’s legal duty to 
rescue his or her patient. Thus, as one 
widely prevalent interpretation of the 
legal situation holds, although the phy­
sician is not prohibited from giving a 
lethal drug to a patient, once that 
patient has taken the drug and be­
comes unconscious, the physician in­
curs a duty to resuscitate him or her.10
These provisions of German law—all 
currently highly controversial— have 
the effect o f curtailing the role of Ger­
man physicians in suicide, and tend to 
insulate the patient from physician aid. 
Thus German law reinforces a posture 
that might also seem to be a product of 
fear o f euthanasia and suspicion of 
authoritarian physicians: in Germany, 
taking death into one’s own hands in 
these contexts is an individual, private 
matter, to be conducted outside the 
medical establishment and largely 
without its help. This is not to say that 
the provisions of German law are the 
product o f studiedjudicial deliberation 
or current political consensus; they are 
often viewed as an artifact o f earlier 
times. In any case, although it ap­
parently would not be illegal for physi­
cians to assist in the initiation of their 
patients’ suicides, as a matter o f practice 
they do not do so. There is some move 
to suggest that the obligation to rescue 
extends beyond the physician to a 
spouse, friend, or any person with 
knowledge of a suicide in progress, but 
this is currently an extremely contro­
versial issue in German law.
That neither suicide nor assisted sui­
cide are illegal under German law does 
not mean that there can be no attempts 
to prevent suicide. Indeed, Germany 
has an active organization for suicide 
prevention, the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fur Suizidpravention (the German 
Society for Suicide Prevention), which 
directs its attention in particular to rec­
ognizing suicidal tendencies in dis­
turbed, depressed, or demented per­
sons— that is, persons who cannot be 
said to be in control of their actions and 
who are not exhibiting freely re­
sponsible choice. Since, o f course, it is 
not always possible to determine in ad­
vance whether a given person’s suicide 
might count as in control or not in 
control, or as the product or not the 
product o f freely reponsible choice, in 
practice Germany’s suicide prevention 
efforts look very much like those else­
where, and are generally directed 
across the board at preventing suicide.11
It is in this climate, then— a climate 
in which there are active programs of 
suicide prevention, in which suicide 
and assisted suicide are not illegal, and 
in which terminal patients have little 
control within the medical estab­
lishment—that the German Society for 
Humane Dying, the DGHS, has 
developed. It is not much known in the 
rest o f the world, among other reasons 
because it has not joined the World 
Federation o f Right-To-Die Societies. 
This is in part a function o f its very 
different attitudes about the relation­
ship o f suicide and euthanasia, ex­
plained by the profound mistrust (Ger­
mans have o f euthanasia: the DGHS 
insists that euthanasia cannot be legal­
ized without /worlegalization of assisted 
suicide;12 the World Federation and the 
national right-to-die organizations 
which are its members support the im­
mediate legalization o f euthanasia and 
assisted suicide as well, as would have 
been the case with the state o f Washing­
ton’s Initiative 119 and the proposed 
California legislation. In part because 
the Dutch, American, and most other 
national right-to-die societies, including 
the U.S.’s Hemlock Society, see the 
issue of euthanasia in a way quite op­
posite from the DGHS, there is little 
love lost between them, and even in 
Germany the DGHS remains a highly 
controversial organization. Neverthe­
less, the DGHS is a major, functioning 
organization, and its activities are im­
portant to understand for those discuss­
ing end-of-life issues in the U.S. and 
other parts o f the world.
The German Society for Humane 
Dying (DGHS)
Founded in 1980 to facilitate suicide 
for those who are terminally ill as a way 
of avoiding the medicalization of the 
end of life, by September 1991 the 
DGHS had grown to some 50,000 mem­
bers, and has been adding new mem­
bers at the rate o f 1,000 per month. 
Many ofits members are already elderly 
or already terminally ill. After a person 
has been a member o f the organization 
for at least a year, he or she may request 
a copy of DGHS’s booklet Menschenwiir-
diges und selbstverantwortlichcs Sterben, or 
“Dignified and responsible death,” 
which is not commercially available.
The DGHS does not charge for this 
booklet. The booklet itself includes a 
statement o f the conditions under 
which it is obtainable— including the 
requirement that the member has not 
received medical or psychotherapeu­
tic treatment for depression or other 
psychiatric illness during the last two 
years. Each copy is numbered; the 
member is urged to keep track o f it, 
not to give it to third parties, and not 
to make public its contents in any 
other way. The booklet is to be re­
turned to DGHS after the member’s 
death. The DGHS reports approxi­
mately 2,000 to 3,000 suicides per year 
among its members.
The specific advice provided in the 
DGHS’s booklet contains, among other 
things, a list o f ten drugs available by 
prescription in Germany, mostly bar­
biturates and chloroquines, together 
with the specific dosages necessary for 
producing a painless, nonviolent death. 
(Although the DGHS was originally as­
sociated with the provision of cyanide, 
it no longer recommends this.) In addi­
tion to the drugs that will produce 
death, the booklet lists companion 
drugs for preventing vomiting and for 
inducing sedation. It also lists drugs 
available without prescription in other 
European countries (some just a few 
hours drive from parts o f Germany), 
including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece. DGHS recommends that 
the member approach a physician for a 
prescription for the drug of choice, 
asking, for example, for a barbiturate to 
help with sleeping or chloroquine for 
protection against malaria on a trip to 
India. Where this deception is difficult 
or impossible, the DGHS may also ar­
range for someone to obtain drugs 
from a country where they are available 
without prescription. In unusual cases, 
it will also provide what it calls Sterbebe- 
gleitung or “accompaniment in dying”: 
this is provided by a companion who 
will remain with the person during the 
time that is required for the lethal drug 
to take full effect, often as much as ten 
to twelve hours or longer. However, the 
DGHS now urges that family members 
or friends, rather than DGHS staff or 
members, provide “accompaniment,” 
and has recently inaugurated an “Aka- 
demie der Sterbebegleitung” or 
academy o f accompaniment in dying to 
train such persons in what to expect and 
how to be supportive.
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DGHS also supports refusal o f treat­
ment, where that is what the patient 
wishes, and in general attempts to pro­
tect a broad range of patients’ rights. It 
provides members with a series o f 
forms, including copies o f Germany’s 
version o f the living will and durable 
power o f attorney. In the format pro­
vided by the DGHS, both of these forms 
not only stipulate health care choices or 
persons empowered to make them on 
behalf o f a no-longer-competent 
patient, but they also include provisions 
authorizing the DGHS to take legal ac­
tion against any person or organization 
(that is, any physician or hospital) that 
refuses to honor the patient’s antece­
dently stipulated wishes. For those who 
choose suicide as away of bringing their 
lives to an end, the DGHS also provides 
a form intended to provide clear evi­
dence both of the considered nature of 
that choice and to dispel any suspicion 
o f foul play. The form— printed on a 
single sheet of distinctive pink paper— 
is to be signed once when the person 
joins the DGHS, asserting that he or she 
is a member o f the organization and 
that he or she wishes to exercise the 
right to determine the time of his or her 
death; the same form is to be signed 
again at the time of the suicide— pre­
sumably, at least a year later—and to be 
left beside the body.
DGHS also relies heavily on its net­
work o f regional bureaus to encourage 
and facilitate feedback. Since assisting 
suicide is not illegal in Germany, there 
is no legal risk for an individual in soli­
citing information about suicide or in 
that person’s family reporting back in­
formation about methods o f suicide 
attempted or used. DGHS attempts to 
keep very careful track of its members’ 
experiences with the information it 
provides, and uses this feedback to re­
vise and update its drug recommenda­
tions. To facilitate this, the drug infor­
mation provided in its booklet is 
printed on a separate sheet inserted in 
a slip pocket inside the back cover, and 
this list o f current recommendations is 
revised and updated on a monthly 
basis. DGHS thus claims to be able to 
do what is much riskier in countries 
where assisting suicide is illegal: to make 
extensive use o f feedback about actual 
methods o f suicide. In mid-1991, when 
the Hemlock Society’s president Derek 
Humphry’s book Final Exit hit the top 
of the New York Times how-to bestseller
list,13 DGHS president Hans Henning 
Atrott complained that the American 
book’s information wasn’t fully reliable: 
it was based, Atrott claimed, on pub­
lished toxicological information, or in­
formation about what drug doses might 
prove sufficiently toxic to cause death, 
and not on empirical information 
about what drug doses would be certain 
to cause death. Because of the quite 
different legal situation in Germany, 
DGHS is able to collect reports about its 
own members’ suicides and thus to ad­
just its drug recommendations on the 
basis o f actual experience. Humphry 
replied that he gets just as much infor­
mation from the 47,000 members of 
the Hemlock Society, including explicit 
information about suicide deaths from 
patients’ families, from doctors, and 
even occasionally from patients whose 
suicide attempts were not fatal,14 but it 
is clear that such information is col­
lected in a very different climate in the 
U.S. Fearing that they would be sub­
poenaed, the Hemlock Society was 
forced several years ago to burn first- 
person reports from a sizeable number 
o f physicians of cases o f euthanasia they 
had performed or suicide in which they 
had assisted.
Language and the Cultural 
Acceptance o f Suicide
Beyond doubt, the unique legal situa­
tion in Germany contributes to the 
rather different way in which end-of-life 
issues are often viewed; so too does the 
rapid growth of an organization like the 
DGHS. But there are deeper cultural 
factors involved, and these are nowhere 
more evident than in the German lan­
guage itself.
In current usage, English provides 
one principal term to denote self­
caused death, suicide. In contrast to Eng­
lish ’s primary reliance on a single term, 
German employs several distinct ones: 
the traditional terms Selbstmord and 
Selbsttdtung, the scientific term Suizid, 
and the literary Freitod.1"' Selbstmord 
and Selbsttdtung are the analogues o f 
the English terms self-murder (also 
self-murther) and self-killing, which 
were in widespread use in English 
during the seventeenth and eigh­
teenth centuries; in English these 
terms were eventually supplanted by 
the Latin construct suicide and have 
virtually disappeared from contem­
porary use. The German terms both 
remain current. The German Selbst­
mord, the term most frequently used 
in ordinary spoken and written dis­
course, carries extremely negative 
connotations, no doubt associated 
with its literal meaning “self­
murder,” including the implication 
o f moral wrong. In partial contrast, 
Selbsttdtung, literally “self-killing,” has 
connotations that are comparatively 
neutral in their factual quality but still 
decidedly negative, just as killing is 
neutral in English compared to murder 
but still decidedly negative. Selbsttdtung 
is used primarily in bureaucratic and 
legal contexts. The German term 
Suizid, the Latinate construct linguisti­
cally analogous to the English term sui­
cide, also literally means “self-killing” but 
is comparatively neutral in its moral 
connotations; instead, it conveys an im­
plication of psychiatric pathology, and 
is the technical term characteristically 
used by clinicians and researchers. 
While these terms are primarily found 
in their conversational, bureaucratic, 
and clinical applications respectively, 
they are also sometimes used inter­
changeably.
German’s fourth term for self-caused 
death, however, is quite another matter. 
Freitod (literally “free death” or “volun­
tary death”) is a positive term, free from 
connotations o f either moral wrong­
ness or pathology; it also avoids the 
drabness o f bureaucratic facticity. It is 
associated with voluntary individual 
choice and the expression of basic, 
strongly held personal values or ideals, 
especially those running counter to 
conventional societal norms, and sug­
gests the triumph o f personal integrity 
in the face o f threat or shame. Freitod 
has an archaic flavor, often associated 
with Romanticism, and would not 
generally be used in ordinary conver­
sation; however, it is readily recogniz­
able to most speakers. But while the 
most common term for suicide, Selbst­
mord, and the comparatively uncom­
mon literary one, Freitod, both refer to 
the act o f bringing about one’s own 
death, they have very different conno­
tations and describe what are under­
stood to be quite different sorts of acts. 
Selbstmord is taken to involve a generally 
repugnant, tragic act, generally as­
sociated with despair, anger, or depres­
sion; Freitod, in contrast, is seen as ex­
pressing voluntary, idealistic choice.
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Even the verbs used with the different 
German terms for suicide reinforce 
their semantic differences: one “com­
mits” Selbstmord (man begehl Selbstmord), 
but one “chooses” Freitod (man wdhltden 
Frdtod). It is not grammatically possible 
to speak either o f “choosing” Selbstmord 
or o f “committing” Freitod.
To be sure, both English and (ierman 
also offer a variety o f peripheral terms 
to refer to suicide—for example, Eng­
lish’s self-destruction and the archaic self­
slaughter, German’s Selbstentldbung (lit­
erally, “self-disembodiment”) , all terms 
with strong connotations o f violence, as 
well as an assortment o f verbal expres­
sions, many of which appear in similar 
forms in both English and German: sich 
das Leben nehmen ( “take one’s own life “) 
and often make reference to the means 
of death employed: sicherhangen (“hang 
oneself’), sich erschieften ( “shoot one­
self’), sich ertranken ( “drown oneself’), 
and so on. But the central contrast lies 
between English’s current reliance on 
a single principal term, suicide, and Ger­
man’s routine use o f several different 
terms, especially Selbstmord, Selbsttotung, 
Suizid, and Freitod. Despite its compara­
tive archaism and infrequentusage, this 
latter term, Frdtod, plays an especially 
significant role and is crucial to under­
standing the nature o f institutionalized 
assisted suicide practices in contem­
porary (iermany.
The term Frdtod is often thought by 
educated Germans to date from the 
eighteenth century, emerging around 
the same time that Frederick the Great 
was decriminalizing suicide. The term 
seems particularly associated with the 
Sturm und Drang or Storm and Stress 
movement in German literature, espe­
cially the plays o f Goethe and Schiller—  
plays read, o f course, by German stu­
dents during their high school years. 
Perhaps the most familiar, celebrated 
example o f Frdtod in German literature 
would be said to be the death o f 
Goethe’s character Werther, the hero of 
his 1774 novella The Sorrows of Young 
Werther.in this compelling tale, aprojec- 
tion o f Goethe’s own ill-fated love affair 
with Charlotte Buff, Werther chooses to 
end his own life rather than sink from 
a condition o f extraordinary sensitivity 
and sensibility into the respectable te­
dium of everyday life.16
Curiously, however, etymological 
sources do not actually trace the word 
Frdtod as far back as Goethe; rather, they
find that it originates with the title of 
Section 22 o f Nietzsche’s Also Sprach 
Zarathustra (1883), Vom Frden Tod-e 
(variously translated “On free death” or 
“On voluntary death”).1' In this work, 
Nietzsche develops the notion of Uber- 
mensch or “superman,” a concept later 
misunderstood and appropriated by 
National Socialism, and asserts a central 
teaching o f Zarathustra; “Die at the 
right time. ” Mdnen Tod lobe ich euch, dm 
frden Tod, dermirkommt, wdlich wiU, says 
Zarathustra— “My death, praise I unto 
unto me because /want i t ”18 The death 
to be avoided is the “common, 
withered, patient death” o f those who 
are “like sour apples”: their lotis to “wait 
until the last day of autumn: and at the 
same time they become ripe, yellow, 
and shrivelled.” The death that Zara­
thustra preaches is an active, extraordi­
nary, heroic death, an earlier, self-willed 
death of which the ordinary man is 
hardly capable.
Perhaps because o f the association o f 
Nietzsche’s Ubermensch with Nazism, 
Frdtod with its quite positive connota­
tions is rarely thought to originate 
there, and is instead attributed, er­
roneously, to the pre-Romantic idea. 
But the term is not found in either 
Goethe or Schiller, and indeed the 
single term, Frdtod, is not even found in 
Nietzsche, though it originates from 
Nietzsche’s two-word phrase.19 ’Yet how­
ever problematic its actual origins, the 
term does have a distinctive, well-recog­
nized sense in contemporary German: 
although it refers to the act o f bringing 
about one’s own death, it does not con­
vey the very negative moral connota­
tions associated with Selbstmord, the fac­
tual but still negative connotations of 
Selbsttotung or the pathological ones as­
sociated with Suizid. On the contrary, 
the connotations o f the term Frdtod are 
wholly positive: achieving this kind of 
death is an admirable, heroic— if very 
difficult—thing to do.
There is no analogous term in Eng­
lish. While there have been recent at­
tempts at coinages in English (for ex­
ample, self-deliverance) to describe sui­
cide but avoid that term’s negative con­
notations, there is no widely recog­
nized, familiar English term with long 
historical resonances o f the sort that 
Frdtod seems to have. The only other 
English terms for suicide that do not 
have negative connotations carry either 
pronounced religious associations or
the implication that the suicide serves 
the interest o f some other person or 
cause: these are terms like self-saaifice 
and martyrdom. The very concept of 
Frdtod—a notion without religious, al­
truistic overtones and without nega­
tive moral or psychological implica­
tions, but which celebrates the volun­
tary choice o f death as a personal 
expression o f principled idealism— is, 
in short, linguistically unfamiliar to 
English speakers. Language is crucial 
in shaping attitudes about end-of-life 
practices, and because o f the very 
different lexical resources o f English 
and German, it is clear that English 
speakers cannot straightforwardly un­
derstand the very different German 
conception o f these matters. Even in 
situations o f terminal illness, the very 
concept of voluntary death resonates 
differently for the German speaker 
who conceives o f it as Frdtod than it 
does for the English-speakerwho con­
ceives o f it as suicide.
Thus, while one sees in both Ger­
many and the U.S. the development o f 
notions of what is often cal led rational 
suicide and the conception that this 
may be a reasonable choice in terminal 
illness, they occur in very different cul­
tural climates. In an English-speaking 
country like the United States, in con­
trast, there is no tradition that recog­
nizes a distinctive sort o f suicide, differ­
ent from immoral or pathological sui­
cide, and no tradition of legal or other 
protection for it. Not even among the 
English Romantics is there a literary 
model quite like Werther, whose death 
could readily be described as Frdtod, 
The sense of the German term Frdtod is 
simply not to be found in any single 
term in English. Furthermore, it could 
be constructed in English only with 
comparatively clumsy circumlocutions: 
“suicide which is self-centered but 
without the negative connotations of 
either ‘suicide’ or ‘self-centered’ ”; “self­
deliverance but with long, positive his­
torical resonances,” and so on, but 
these paraphrases would hardly cap­
ture the rich connotative field that has 
developed around the term Frdtod. This 
is not to say that German speakers are 
always actively aware of the history and 
connotations o f Frdtod, but that the 
German language provides resources 
for thinking about, expressing, and ex­
periencing choices about suicide in ter­
minal illness in a way that English does
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not Itis tempting to say, then, that these 
choices themselves may be rather 
different for the German speaker than 
the English speaker. I f so, it is also 
plausible to suppose that choices o f sui­
cide in terminal illness, protected not 
only by legal but also by linguistic and 
hence conceptual supports, may be 
much easier to make in Germany than 
they are in the U.S., where legal, linguis­
tic, and conceptual structures all mili­
tate against them. Furthermore, pre­
sumably, not only may these choices be 
easier for the German speaker to make, 
they may also be easier for survivors to 
accept and for the culture as a whole to 
acknowledge. O f course, there are fac­
tors in German culture that militate 
against suicide as well— religious sanc­
tions, for example; but the picture may 
nevertheless be rather different from 
the one we see in the U.S.
Indeed, the DGHS deliberately ex­
ploits the conception o f ending one’s 
life in terminal illness as Freitod rather 
than Selbstmord The distinctive pink 
form mentioned earlier, to be signed 
when joining the DGHS and to be 
signed again at the time of one’s final 
act, does not refer to that act as suicide, 
butas free death: it is labelled Freitod-Ver- 
jugung or “free death directive.” On 
the line just prior to the space for the 
second signature, the form reads: Ich 
habe heuie mdnen Freitod eingeleitet.— "I 
have brought about my free death 
today." This is the form that will be 
found beside the body. The terms Selbst­
mord and Suizid appear nowhere in this 
document, and the bureaucratic term 
Selbsttotung appears only on the reverse 
side in the language o f quotations from 
German law about the legal status of 
suicide.
From Language to Practice
To be sure, many objections can be 
raised to the conception of suicide that 
the notion of Freitod supports or to its 
institutionalization in the practices of 
the DGHS. For example, because the 
German practice o f assisted suicide, as 
shaped both by law and by linguistic 
expectation, tends to minimize the role 
of the physician, it tends as well to min­
imize the opportunity for whatever eval­
uation, counseling, and psychiatric 
consultation the physician might pro­
vide. It also leaves to the patient the 
primary responsibility for deciding
whether the physician’s diagnosis is ac­
curate and the prognosis realistic, and 
whether there are other effective 
methods of treatment or symptom re­
lief. There is little or no role for psychi­
atrists here, or for any other outside, 
“objective” evaluation o f a patient’s 
mental state. Freitod is conceived o f as a 
profoundly individual, private matter, 
not one subject to external examina­
tion, which in any case runs counter to 
commonplace societal norms. This is 
not to say that every terminally ill per­
son who commits suicide in Germany 
conceives o f this act as Freitod or ap­
proximates it to the independent, Ro- 
mantic/Nietzschean model as an ex­
pression o f one’s basic values, but the 
likelihood of this is, o f course, much 
greater than in the United States, where 
an analogous conceptual model is not 
readily available at all.
Some objections are also raised to the 
portrayal o f suicide in terminal illness 
as Freitod rather than as Selbstmord, Selbst­
totung or Suizid. For example, in a 1977 
discussion of issues in voluntary death, 
the writer Gabriele Wohmann said she 
did not like to use the term Freitod in 
these discussions because it is “simply 
too pretty, too seemingly tasteful. ”so Nor 
do all discussions o f the issue trade on 
emphasizing the opposition between 
Selbstmord with its highly negative con­
notations and Freitod with its positive 
ones; many o f the academic discussions 
employ the comparatively neutral 
term Selbsttotung instead,2] and others 
attempt to cleanse the usual term Selbst­
mord by rejecting its negative connota­
tions.
Questions can also be raised about 
the fit between the concept o f Freitod 
and the assisted suicide practices 
possible in contemporary Germany. 
Freitod itself is conceived o f as an in­
dividual, intensely personal, and thus 
characteristically solitary act. The word 
itself does not suggest (as is often the 
case with euthanasia in Holland) that 
the period o f dying is one in which one 
might expect to be surrounded by a 
devoted family or close friends, or sup­
ported by a trusted authority such as a 
priest or doctor. Nor does the German 
term suggest that one would be guided 
in one’s decision by professionals or 
family members. It is an act in which 
one insists on choosing a different, in­
dividual course contrary to ordinary 
expectations: it is in this sense that it is
“free” death. This has its advantages: 
almost by definition, Freitod cannot be 
socially “expected,” required by policy, 
advised by counselors, or in any other 
way the norm, and hence it may be 
more resistant to abuse. Yet this does 
raise the issue of what tensions might 
arise for the person for whom the rhe­
toric o f Freitod seems to describe a 
choice more individualistic and idealis­
tic than he or she is actually making, or, 
conversely, what tensions might arise 
for the person for whom accusations of 
Selbstmord from unsympathetic physi­
cians, family, or religious advisors seem 
to belittle the personal, reflective na­
ture o f his or her final choice. While 
choices o f suicide in terminal illness 
may be easier to make in a linguistically 
richer culture than in one that is more 
limited in its resources for describing 
this choice, such tensions are no doubt 
very real. After all, DGHS is an organi­
zation that offers membership and pro­
vides help with suicide, both in giving 
information and in training family 
members or others to be present—and 
hence in this way the person may be 
accompanied and not alone— but the 
linguistic and cultural model to which 
it appeals is one o f solitary, profoundly 
individual choice.
What, I f  Anything, Can We Learn 
from Germany?
As we observe our increasing fer­
ment in the United States over right-to- 
die issues, we can, I think, predict that 
o f the two forms o f aid-in-dying that are 
the focus o f attention in the U.S.— ac­
tive euthanasia and assisted suicide— it 
is the latter which will more readily find 
some degree o f social acceptance. This 
might seem to make the German ex­
perience with assisted suicide as much 
or more relevant to us than the Dutch 
experience with active euthanasia, and 
to suggest that we should attend to the 
ways in which not only Dutch but also 
German culture has faced such issues. 
Certainly examining other cultures is 
an important remedy for our often 
isolationist myopia about social issues, 
and certainly observing a culture that 
has a far more open, widespread prac­
tice o f assisted suicide in terminal illness 
will be enormously instructive for us.
What we discover, however, is that the 
issue is much more difficult than we 
thought, and that cross-cultural lessons
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are harder to draw. For what we see is 
that we are limited by our own lan­
guage, and do not have the linguistic 
resources for understanding tlie issue 
in the way members o f another culture 
can. We do not and perhaps cannot 
fully understand German attitudes 
towards what we call “suicide,” and we 
cannot really comprehend this other 
way o f looking at the issue— even 
though our cultures, economies, and 
medical establishments are in many 
ways very similar. Forthe German, Selbst­
mord, Selbsttdtung, and Suizid, those phe­
nomena described in terms with con­
notations o f moral wrongness, 
bureaucractic factualness, or psycho­
pathology, are o f course to be pre­
vented, even though the law neither 
prohibits them nor prohibits assisting 
them where they are performed by a 
person who is in control o f his or her 
actions and acting out o f freely re­
sponsible choice. On the other hand, 
the German tends to respect Freitod, 
however difficult it may be to say exactly 
what differentiates this phenomenon 
from the previous forms of self-caused 
death, and tends to regard Freitod as a 
matter o f right— that is, to assume that 
it ought not to be interfered with and 
that one always has the right to this 
choice. Thus, it is at best difficult for us 
in the United States fully to understand 
how members o f German culture see 
these matters, and it is also difficult to 
understand what position the German 
takes himself or herself to be in when 
reflecting on the prospect o f medicali- 
zation o f the end of life and the alterna­
tive o f an earlier, selfcaused death. Even 
if we could somehow capture the dis­
tinctions a German-speaker senses 
among the various terms for self-caused 
death, we could notbringwith them the 
set o f background models and the full 
range of culturally understood conno­
tations. There is no easy English way to 
convey both what Freitod suggest,s and at 
the same time avoid what it does not.
I f  there are distinctions German 
speakers make but English speakers do 
not in speaking o f what we call suicide, 
perhaps we English speakers cannot 
even fully understand our own assump­
tions and beliefs about these matters. 
We say we are committed to “preventing 
suicide,” for example, but this may be 
just to say that we are committed to 
preventing Selbstmord, Selbstotung, and 
Suizid. Are we also committed to pre­
venting Freitod, when we cannot distin­
guish it from these other forms o f self­
caused death, or on the contrary do we 
simply lack any reflective, principled 
view about whether we ought to do so? 
We cannot easily say whether we ought 
to prevent it, given our commitment to 
suicide prevention, because we cannot 
even fully conceive of what it is, and we 
cannot even say either that it is “a kind 
o f suicide” or that it is not.
That we cannot make this distinction 
is not to say that we are altogether in­
capable o f making distinctions among 
accepted, even respected forms of self­
caused death and those we reject or 
consider candidates for prevention. On 
the contrary, English speakers readily 
make the closely related distinction 
noted earlier involving altruistically or 
religiously motivated self caused death. 
Typically, English speakers respond 
with approval, for example, to the jet 
pilot going down with the plane in 
order to avoid the crowded schoolyard, 
but mark the conceptual difference by 
insisting that “that’s not suicide. ” This is 
a response analogous to the one Ger­
man speakers would use to differentiate 
Selbstmord an d Freitod, but the distinction 
is not the same one. The distinction 
between suicide as a moral wrong or 
psychological aberration and as a re- 
ligously or altruistically motivated 
choice is readily marked off in English, 
but the distinction between suicide as a 
moral wrong or psychological aberra­
tion and an autonomous choice based 
in personal ideals and values is not.
WTiat practical lessons, then, does this 
closer examination o f assisted-suicide 
practices in contemporary Germany 
teach us about the United States, and 
particularly about the kinds o f practices 
the U.S. should or should not legally 
recognize, morally recognize, or other­
wise adopt? The central issue, it seems 
to me, has to do with the role o f the 
physician. What is so striking about the 
German practice is the comparative ab­
sence of the physician from the scene; 
the question for the U.S. is not merely 
whether the physician ought to play the 
same absent role, but whether the cul­
tural conceptions that might make sui­
cide in terminal illness a possible choice 
in an English-speaking world argue for 
or against such a role. In examining 
both the Netherlands and Germany, we 
see two strikingly different physician 
roles: one in which the physician re­
sponds to the patient’s request for eu­
thanasia and it is mdyxhe physician (not 
a nurse, family member, or any other 
person except the patient him- or her­
self) who may administer the lethal 
drug, and in which the physician is 
expected to remain with the patient 
(and the patient’s family) throughout 
the time it takes for the drug to produce 
death; the other in which the physician 
is not consulted, except perhaps to ob­
tain the drug, and in any case is not 
presentwhile the drug is ingested or the 
period o f dying occurs. Determining 
what ought to be the role o f the physi­
cian in the United States, if suicide in 
terminal illness is to be both morally 
respected and legally protected, is of 
course a question o f certain practical 
matters— on the one hand, to exclude 
the physician seems to preclude the 
possibility o f counseling, confirmation 
of the diagnosis and prognosis in this 
context, and physician presence and 
assistance, perhaps even reassurance, at 
the time o f death; to include the physi­
cian seems to bring with it the possibility 
o f paternalism, control, institutional 
regulation, and potential inflexibility. 
But it is not only a question o f these ? 
practicalities, however important they 
inay be. It is also a matter o f the fit 
between persons’ conceptions o f what 
they are doing and the structures within 
which it is possible for them to do it, and 
this is a much subtler matter indeed.
These are not easy issues to resolve. 
Worse still, in trying to do so we may find 
ourselves at an impasse: it is well indeed 
to look at other cultures for help with 
our own dilemmas, but doing so also 
obliges us to recognize our own severe 
limitations in attempting to resolve 
them. We maybe able to recognize what 
our problem is: because our language 
is impoverished in its lexical resources 
for referring to self-caused death, we 
are paying the price in increasing social 
tension over this issue. \fet this insight 
does not tell us how to resolve our prob­
lem. I suspect we will find that while 
both the Netherlands and Germany 
can provide profoundly useful lessons 
(if we are careful to see what they are), 
neither the Netherlands nor Germany 
will prove quite the right model for the 
United States. We can expect to watch 
ourselves spend the next decade or two 
developing distinctive, conceptually 
and culturally fitting aid-in-dying prac­
tices o f our own.
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